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MARCIN MIŁKOWSKI 
1 Engineering Epistemological Normativity 
 
The standard objection against naturalised epistemology is that it cannot 
account for normativity in epistemology (Putnam 1982; Kim 1988). 
There are different ways to deal with it. One of the obvious ways is to 
say that the objection misses the point: It is not a bug; it is a feature, as 
there is nothing interesting in normative principles in epistemology. 
Normative epistemology deals with norms but they are of no use in prac-
tice. They are far too general to be guiding principles of research, up to 
the point that they even seem vacuous (see Knowles 2003). 
In this chapter, my strategy will be different and more in spirit of the 
founding father of naturalised epistemology, Quine, though not faithful 
to the letter. I focus on methodological prescriptions supplied by cogni-
tive science in re-engineering cognitive architectures. Engineering norms 
based on mechanism design were not treated as seriously as they should 
in epistemology, and that is why I will develop a sketch of a framework 
for researching them, starting from analysing cognitive science as engi-
neering in section 3, then showing functional normativity in section 4, to 
eventually present functional engineering models of cognitive mecha-
nisms as normative in section 5. Yet before showing the kind of engi-
neering normativity specific for these prescriptions, it is worthwhile to 
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review briefly the role of normative methodology and the levels of norm 
complexity in it, and show how it follows Quine‟s steps. 
Quine insisted on reducing normativity to engineering as taught at 
technical universities, even ethical normativity (Quine 1994). He seemed 
to accept (Q1) or (Q2): 
(Q1) Engineering helps to explain what normativity is. 
(Q2) Engineering helps to reduce normative propositions to practi-
cal/technical knowledge. 
(Q2) seems to be more coherent with Quine‟s position, as he is not in 
general interested in explaining previous theories or frameworks in terms 
of his reductive proposals. The idea is to reduce meaning to behaviour, 
and replace mentalism with behaviourism, and not to explain why men-
talist talk is justified. The explanatory task hinted in (Q1) does not ex-
clude (Q2) but seems less entrenched in his project. 
It is still an open question how far one can go with substituting nor-
mativity with engineering principles. I doubt that ethical theories are just 
like engineering and should be developed at technical universities by en-
gineers, as Quine bluntly claimed. For most moral philosophers today, 
naturalised ethics is supposed to save the phenomenon of normativity and 
explain it rather than to replace it with engineered principles and explain 
it away. A Nietzschean kind of moral philosophy that is committed to 
naturalism and sceptical about the validity of any received moral princi-
ples is rare, as naturalism is hardly committed to overarching scepticism. 
Partial scepticism about the validity of the received view is, however, one 
of the reasons why naturalism remains attractive for many philosophers. 
In epistemology, naturalists can be sceptical about norms in epistemology 
or justification as the most important theme in theory of knowledge. Yet 
Quine‟s suggestion is antisceptical in this regard: “Insofar as theoretical 
epistemology gets naturalised into a chapter of theoretical science, so 
normative epistemology gets naturalised into a chapter of engineering: 
the technology of anticipating sensory stimulation” (Quine 1992: 19). 
Pace Quine, anticipating sensory stimulation is not the essential as-
pect of normative epistemology, as cognition is not only about sensory 
stimulation and external behaviour, as behaviourists thought. Moreover, 
the goal of science should not be conflated with prediction (described as 
anticipation of sensory stimuli) while science is also interested in expla-
74 / MARCIN MIŁKOWSKI 
 
 
nation, understanding and description. Quine could be right about engi-
neering but knowledge engineering is not only about anticipating sensory 
stimuli; it is about generating knowledge, but not necessarily predictive 
knowledge. So the claim inspired by Quine becomes (Q*): 
(Q*)  By using engineering knowledge, it is possible to define norma-
tive criteria for naturalised epistemology. 
The term “normative criteria” is deliberately kept abstract enough to 
cover various kinds of norms. These are not only the principles of cogni-
tive action that are endorsed by agents but also the guidelines for devel-
oping cognitive agents, either by natural selection, or artificially. Another 
kind of normative criteria is connected to those conditions of interaction 
among groups of cognitive agents and with environment that prove to be 
fruitful for development of knowledge. So there are at least three catego-
ries of norms: (1) endorsed by individuals, (2) embodied by individuals 
and (3) embodied by interaction of individuals with each other and with 
their environment. They are all methodological. 
Methodology does not help us develop norms that are valid categori-
cally. As instrumental, they are valid conditionally. In other words, 
methodology does not supply us with the norms that are justified the way 
the moral obligations were supposed to be justified with the help of 
Kant‟s categorical imperative. It is rather on a par with the hypothetical 
imperative that supplies conditional norms such as: If you want to 
achieve X, you should do Y. As Quine would say, if you want to antici-
pate sensory stimulation X, you should do Y (see also Hookway 2002: 
39). However, the antecedent of such conditionals does not have to be 
universally valid or true. In this regard, I agree with Knowles 2003 that 
obligatory universal normative principles are rare in epistemology, if 
they exist at all. This does not mean that there are no prescriptions in 
epistemology. Sometimes they are even more restricted than simple con-
ditionals: A methodological prescription can suggest a method that fails 
in some cases, for example a heuristic method, or a method that is some-
times advisable but not strictly required. 
 
2 Methodological Naturalised Epistemology 
 
In naturalised epistemology, methodology seems to have been largely 
ignored. For example, neither reliabilism nor evidentialism seems to have 
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any bearing for methodology. They just piggy-back on methodology but 
give nothing in return, being motivated solely by philosophical interest in 
reducing epistemic concepts to nonepistemic or by an attempt to define 
knowledge in a Gettier-proof way. This is not, however, based on any 
principled argument against normative methodology in sciences. In non-
armchair epistemology, methodological questions are to be settled by 
scientists rather than with conceptual analysis alone but nothing prevents 
from integrating those questions into the research program of naturalised 
epistemology. 
I suggest that nonfoundational epistemology can be methodological 
and as such normative. A nonmethodological normative epistemology 
(foundational or not) does not seem to make much sense for non-
armchair naturalism, or otherwise it could not be of any use for science. 
Methodology cares about proper methods of acquiring and justifying 
knowledge by cognitive agents. 
Naturalised epistemology can be analysed as operating at least on 
three levels of complexity:  
 cognitive system interaction (fashions, traditions, groups, 
niches…) 
 personal (beliefs, webs of beliefs, theories, desires…) 
 subpersonal (perceptual subsystems, faculties, cognitive 
modules…) 
The distinction between the personal and subpersonal level of description 
(Dennett 1969) is sometimes difficult to spell out precisely, yet I need it 
only for showing that naturalised epistemology can operate on many lev-
els of complexity (the notion of level used in this chapter is the same as 
in Craver 2001). The additional cognitive system interaction level hints 
at developments connected with notions of embodiment and embedded-
ness in cognitive science. 
Cognitive system interaction is a dimension of epistemology that is 
explored by science studies, sociology of knowledge, evolutionary epis-
temology and other disciplines that are not committed to methodological 
solipsism and/or methodological individualism. In my terminology, it 
covers also interpersonal processes. Interaction between individuals gen-
erates a new level of complexity that is different not only quantitatively 
but also qualitatively from individual cognitive achievements1. 
1 Traditionally, sociology of knowledge has been treated as a forerunner of relativism or 
even irrationalism by philosophers of science, but it is just an empirical assumption that 
individual researchers always act like strictly rational and good-willing angels that care 
only about truth and the growth of knowledge, and not about their own careers and eco-
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On the personal level, one can describe the capabilities of a cognitive 
agent to acquire knowledge, the ways she justifies her beliefs, etc. These 
descriptions require using intentional predicates, especially in the realm 
of individual webs of beliefs. The personal level is preferred by antipsy-
chologist, nonnaturalist epistemology, as it is possible to analyse beliefs 
in a pure logical fashion, for example to criticise the logical structure of 
reasoning. Yet, logical hermeneutics deals with just one kind of idealisa-
tions of personal-level beliefs, and not always the most important kind: 
psychotic beliefs can be logically coherent but completely out of sync 
with reality. 
On the subpersonal level, epistemology specifies the mechanisms 
within the cognitive agent that contribute to her personal-level cognitive 
abilities. In traditional epistemology, subpersonal properties were con-
strued of as psychological (in terms of a philosophical, rational psychol-
ogy). Nowadays, cognitive science deals with this level of explanation. 
As cognitive science is a multidisciplinary research program rather than a 
unified science, the predicates that describe subpersonal properties do 
not have to be psychological only but to span multiple levels and disci-
plines (for multiple-level explanations in neuroscience, see Craver 2007). 
Antinaturalist and nonnaturalist philosophy denies the importance of 
the subpersonal level in epistemology, which is sometimes motivated by 
antipsychologism. At the same time, all epistemological theories, includ-
ing antinaturalist epistemology, use the intentional idiom to speak about 
cognitive capabilities. So what antipsychologism denies is not the usage 
of intentional predicates such as “believe”, “think” or “perceive” but cit-
ing nonintentional psychological facts in justifying knowledge. In epis-
temology, rationality, logical structures and justification count, and these 
concepts can be analysed without knowing any underlying psychological 
mechanisms in cognitive agents. 
Interestingly, many modern philosophers, including especially Im-
manuel Kant, were analysing the underlying mental structures, by assum-
ing that they are inaccessible to introspection, in order to vindicate the 
concepts of rationality and justification. Kantian categories and other 
theoretical mechanisms or entities such as transcendental apperception 
are on the subpersonal level. The way the category of causality operates 
is not the way the cognitive agent acts. According to antipsychologism, 
nomic interests. At least in some cases, this assumption is evidently false. Not to mention 
that science is only possible not as an individual but a collective achievement. 
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this must be viewed as a commitment to psychologism, and implies a se-
rious methodological error, or Kant‟s theory is to be reconstructed in 
terms of logical structures. I suggest otherwise. 
In Kantian epistemology, the hypothesised subpersonal structures are 
a priori: Their use is justified independently of experience2. In cognitive 
science, empirical hypotheses about analogous structures and processes 
are being developed, and naturalised epistemology cheerfully endorses 
those hypotheses (if confirmed by empirical data). 
The subpersonal level is necessary for any cognitive system to be 
cognitive. While it is possible to abstract from the way the cognitive per-
sonal level capabilities are realised on the lower level, and describe the 
logical structure of beliefs or theories, those capabilities are instantiated 
always and only if underlying lower level properties are also instantiated; 
higher level properties depend on the lower level properties of the sys-
tem. Note that because there could be external factors on higher levels, 
such as other cognitive systems, time pressure, or tiredness, that may af-
fect cognitive performance, higher level properties in most cases will 
never be fully reducible to lower level properties3. 
At the subpersonal level, the cognitive architecture that generates 
knowledge in a system is the most important factor. Note that on any 
analysis of the notion of knowledge (traditional, reliabilist, disjunctiv-
ist…), you cannot ascribe true knowledge to a dysfunctional cognitive 
system. In next sections, I will focus on the subpersonal level and its 
functional characteristics to show one of the kinds of normativity in natu-
ralised epistemology. 
The body of knowledge in scientific methodologies concerns mostly 
personal level achievements of cognitive agents, and as far as it is em-
pirically valid, naturalised epistemology cannot question it. Environ-
mental and other interaction-dependent factors, which are now being 
taken into account (if sometimes exaggerated) in embodied and embed-
ded cognition theories, also play a role in cognitive processes. The norms 
on the personal level are most likely to be methodological prescriptions 
2 If you understand Kant‟s project nonfoundationally, you can see that a priori does not 
mean conceptual; for a nonfoundational reading of Kantian project, see Kitcher 1995 and 
Miłkowski 2007. 
3 This is because systems on all three abovementioned levels of organization are never 
fully isolated or completely autonomous, and they can be influenced from the outside. 
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to be followed consciously, and their normative character is just of the 
kind displayed by the hypothetical imperative. 
In order to be a successful cognitive agent, you should behave the way 
other successful cognitive agents behave according to scientific method-
ology prescriptions. For example, a nonpractical norm of scientific meth-
odology would be, as Knowles 2003 shows, “avoid contradiction”, as 
you cannot effectively rule out contradiction in most real-world cases due 
to the immense computational complexity of the task (in decidable logi-
cal systems; it is not feasible in incomplete systems). However, more de-
tailed norms, like “change beliefs if you find a deep contradiction” or 
“treat contradiction as a nondirect proof” are more viable in some cogni-
tive niches, like mathematics. Another viable norm at the personal level 
for a modern scientist would be “submit your papers to peer-reviewed 
journals”. 
On the interaction level, the norms are also instrumental. There are 
functional systems that interact and their interactions may become dys-
functional, so there could be functional normativity. Cognitive agents can 
communicate and share hypothetical imperatives. It is an open question 
whether conscious sharing and debating norms among cognitive agents 
should be accounted for as generating simply personal-level norms, or as 
involving larger systems (i.e., organizations such as research agencies) 
with their level of hypothetical imperatives. I leave the personal and in-
teraction level questions mostly aside as they are outside of the scope of 
the current paper. However, norms on all levels stay instrumental and are 
not normative sui generis: they are reducible to hypothetical imperative 
conditionals that do not express obligations. 
 
3 Cognitive Science and Evolutionary Theory as Engineering 
 
As Dennett (1995) argues, cognitive science and evolutionary biology are 
engineering sciences, construed of along the lines of the “sciences of the 
artificial” in Herbert Simon‟s sense (Simon 1996). These sciences use 
the “design stance” to describe and predict phenomena. The difference 
between the standard engineering practice and these sciences is that the 
latter are focused mainly on reverse engineering, while nonreverse engi-
neering is used to confirm the hypotheses about the reliability of the de-
sign being reverse-engineered. At the same time, there is a growing re-
search community on artificial life and artificial intelligence, which are 
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clearly closely linked with engineering, evolutionary theory and cogni-
tive science. 
I suggest that naturalised epistemology uses exactly the same stance 
as cognitive science to describe cognitive processes on the subpersonal 
level.  The notion of “function” is not a physical notion, and it is not as-
cribed from the physical stance but from the design stance (Dennett 
1971). Subpersonal structures are functional: the human mind is con-
ceived of as a complex system of interacting faculties (or modules) that 
contribute to personal-level cognitive capabilities (for a vindication of 
massive modularity, see Carruthers 2006).  
The task of cognitive science is to discover the functional structures 
and processes of mind on the subpersonal level, and these structures are 
of interest for normative naturalised epistemology. Most (if not all) natu-
ralised theories of cognition should be translatable into engineering pro-
jects: if you know how cognition proceeds, you should be able to repli-
cate the process in an artefact or explain why it cannot be replicated.  
In other words, in order to build successful cognitive agents, you need 
to engineer and/or reverse-engineer their cognitive architecture. By in-
vestigating the individual components of the architecture and their inter-
action, you can see which solutions are functional and which are not. If 
you know why a system fails to function normally, and know the way to 
fix it, you can repair it. After finding a viable way to extend its cognitive 
abilities, you can supply the system with new cognitive components that 
will enhance its cognitive performance. All three cases: discovery of the 
architecture, maintaining the performance of the architecture, and extend-
ing the architecture, imply a specific kind of normativity. This normativ-
ity is embedded in the engineering of the cognitive architecture. 
 
4 Cognitive Architecture Functions in Normative  
Epistemology 
 
Subpersonal level cognitive architecture is described from the design 
stance. Design stance specifications provide descriptions of functions or 
functional complexes. The notion of function has been discussed in phi-
losophy of science for several decades, and at least three kinds of func-
tion concepts have been proposed: causal role based, etiological, and 
structural. The causal role account ascribes function to a system compo-
nent that contributes causally to the system level capability (Cummins 
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1975). The etiological account ascribes function to a system component 
that has been selected in the system because it contributed causally to the 
system capability in the past (Wright 1973; Millikan 1984). The struc-
tural account ascribes function to a system component when it serves a 
function in the system design (Krohs 2004, Krohs 2009) or contributes to 
the system autonomy (Bickhard 2000, Bickhard 2004). The design-based 
notion requires that a component of the system be ascribed function not 
just because it has a causal role or was inherited but because it is selected 
by the design for this function. The selection process can be natural or 
artificial. 
It is often noted that functional attributions are normative in a very 
specific sense: something may fail to function properly, and this failure is 
used for evaluative purposes. The causal account of function fails to 
make the distinction between function and dysfunction: if a TV set 
breaks, the causal chains still occur and they contribute to the system 
capability of keeping the screen black, for example. The etiological ac-
count fails for first tokens of the system, as they have no selection history 
that would specify the components. For this reason, the prototypes of AI 
systems will always be dysfunctional. Autonomy account would also 
make partial AI systems dysfunctional: as long as you do not have the 
model of the whole iguana, no part of the iguana can be functional. But 
because the research starts with relatively isolated subsystems that are 
not fully autonomous, it would be useful to be able to distinguish the 
properly functioning systems from the broken ones. This is what the de-
sign-based account enables (Krohs 2009). It is a happy coincidence that 
the design account uses the notion of design also used in the notion of the 
design stance. In what follows, I will assume that design stance functions 
be analysed in a design-based account. 
A design-stance description refers to a functional structure (design) of 
the system. Cognitive architecture description provides criteria for 
evaluation of the functioning of a cognitive system and its subsystems. If 
something essential in the architecture is missing, system becomes dys-
functional, and fails to fulfil cognitive functions. The notion of architec-
ture, i.e., the abstract specification of the system component interactions, 
is equivalent to the notion of the system design. 
Functional normativity is instrumental. If a TV set stops functioning, 
it is not a failure to fulfil a moral prescription. It is just useless as a TV 
set. This kind of normativity can be analysed either in terms of means 
and ends (the end is to watch television on the device, the means is the 
architecture that works in home environment), or in terms of instrumental 
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values. In both cases, it is a derived kind of normativity, subsumable un-
der the hypothetical imperative. But we do not need any more normativ-
ity on the subpersonal level in naturalised epistemology. 
 
5 Artificial Cognitive Systems As Models for Epistemology 
 
In research on cognition, one can take a biologically inspired approach 
(reverse engineering) or artefact-inspired approach (engineering). These 
approaches can intermingle, as artefacts are often also biologically in-
spired, like wings of a plane. But there are artefacts that have no coun-
terparts in the evolutionary world, such as wheels, that cannot be evolved 
for morphological reasons but remain–in their niche–a very good techni-
cal solution. It remains an open question whether artificial systems that 
are able, for example, to prove theorems in a way that is too difficult for 
a human being (like the four colours theorem), are minimally cognitive. 
We may expect, however, that future cognitive systems will have capaci-
ties that are more like wheels than like wings. 
These wheel-like cognitive capacities are at least as important in natu-
ralised epistemology as research on biological cognition. Building cogni-
tive systems that are not modelled on animal or human cognition has al-
ways been the goal of epistemological theories. Specifically, one can set 
out to sketch the overall design specifications for a cognitive robot–these 
would serve roughly the same role as the traditional notion of the tran-
scendental subject. For that purpose, conceptual arguments will not suf-
fice. Naturalised epistemology must consult engineering sciences such as 
AI and cognitive science. 
So joining the forces between philosophical analysis of cognition per 
se and engineering of cognitive systems can lead to android epistemol-
ogy, as Clark Glymour dubbed it–to epistemology that can analyse non-
biological cognitive systems (see Ford, Glymour & Hayes 1995; Ford, 
Glymour & Hayes 2006). They could be arbitrarily stronger or weaker 
than natural cognitive systems. Just by juxtaposing those artificial mod-
els with natural agents, one could try to see the really cognitive aspect of 
their actions. 
The research on artificial cognitive architectures has several benefits. 
First of all, it is ethical to test which dysfunctions are caused by switch-
ing off some modules in a simple artificial cognitive system. This is im-
possible with research on human beings, and it can be argued that such 
experiments on animals are also too cruel. A second benefit is that trans-
lation of abstract models into engineering specifications requires that the 
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conceptual vagueness be replaced with specific solutions. Thirdly, unex-
pected consequences of idealised models are discovered: the frame prob-
lem can be thought of as an unexpected implication of the propositional 
model of cognition that reduces cognition to reasoning in classical logic. 
Even approaches that were mildly hostile to engineering in investigating 
cognition, like Heidegger‟s, can be turned into requirements for making 
cognitive systems as embedded in their environments. In the process, the 
hermeneutical model of interpreting Heidegger‟s Sein und Zeit is re-
placed with actually improving upon his ideas (see for example Wheeler 
2005). 
Another benefit is that it becomes testable whether a given model of 
cognition works or not. Though initially it can be unclear why a given 
system is dysfunctional, after comparing different implementations of the 
similar architecture, one can see if it can really work. This is of course 
impossible for armchair conceptual analysis. 
The cognitive science on the subpersonal level can supply normative 
principles for cognitive architectures, and these normative principles, 
which would generally determine what is minimally required for certain 
cognitive capacities, are available for use in naturalised epistemology. 
Similarly, personal-level intentional requirements of rationality as stud-
ied by methodology and psychology supply normative principles. They 
are instrumental as well–if they do not involve any moral obligation. The 
interaction level is the same in this regard, as it uses both kinds of princi-
ples. To wit, naturalised epistemology can be normative if it uses detailed 
results of cognitive science, science methodology, psychology and other 
sciences. The normative principles in epistemology are not however 
vague and general norms like “avoid contradiction”, but specific and 
constrained heuristic principles of design. 
There is no general and effective algorithm for discovering the laws 
of nature or deducting all possible true propositions, as Tarski and Gödel 
proved. Hume‟s problem of induction will remain unsolved for limited 
beings. So there is no hope that a single methodological prescription 
would say what to do to get all true knowledge as it would presuppose 
that there is an effective algorithm to get them. At the same time, there 
are effective algorithms that deal only with discovering some laws in a 
limited domain or deducting some true propositions (if the system is in-
complete). So there might be constrained algorithms with a limited scope 
of application in normative epistemology, but there is no hope for a 
groundbreaking normative philosopher‟s stone. 
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